

APPEAL NO. 040305
FILED APRIL 5, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on January 14, 2004. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by deciding that the compensable injury of _____, does extend to and include the respondent's (claimant) cervical spine, lumbar spine, bilateral wrists, and left knee but does not extend to and include the claimant's right knee. The appellant (carrier) appealed the extent-of-injury determination favorable to the claimant arguing that it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be unfair and manifestly unjust. The appeal file does not contain a response from the claimant.

DECISION

Affirmed.

We have held that the question of the extent of an injury is a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard, we find there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the hearing officer's extent-of-injury finding.

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Gary L. Kilgore
Appeals Judge

Edward Vilano
Appeals Judge